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Abstract
This article aims to provide a summary to governments 
and stakeholders in developing countries on the 
function, strengths and potential drawbacks of ‘feed-
in tariffs’ (FITs) as one possible market incentive to 
increase the share of grid - and mini-grid - connected 
renewable electricity generation. It is important that 
FITs are not seen as a ‘silver bullet’, but rather as 
one policy option to complement others aimed at 
overcoming the barriers to significant and sustained 
investment in low-carbon energy. Despite the long-
term rise in fossil fuel prices, the fact remains that 
most grid-connected renewable energy technologies 
(RETs) require financial support in order to compete 
with electricity generated from conventional primary 
energy sources, principally coal, natural gas and 
large-scale hydro-energy. In many countries, a lack 
of clear and stable revenue support for renewable 
energy (RE) has simply deterred investors from 
backing RE projects. 
For developing countries, many of which have 
significant renewable energy resources, harnessing 
this ‘freely available’ energy is one way to offset 
domestic energy shortages, reduce import bills for 
hydrocarbons and expand energy access, especially 
in rural areas. In this article, an explanation is 
given of how FITs work followed by a discussion of 
their relative success in promoting RETs in OECD 
economies, taking into account broader aspects of the 
country and policy contexts. The rest of the article 
focuses on how FITs can be adapted for developing 
countries, considering their main benefits, potential 
costs and drawbacks.
2Introduction
‘Feed-in Tariffs’ (FITs) provide a minimum guaranteed 
price paid by utilities to all generators of electricity 
from renewable energy, supplying, or ‘feeding into’ 
the grid. The exact value of tariff support is set by the 
government, usually for a fixed time period, and tends 
to vary according to the type of generation technology.i 
The cost of feed-in tariffs is normally assumed by 
electricity utilities and then passed on to, i.e. divided 
among, all consumers. As such, FITs are a form of 
cross-subsidy designed to encourage investment 
in clean and low-carbon electricity generation, 
without placing a cap or quota on the amount of 
RE generation (Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Haas 
et al., 2011). However, they are unlike conventional 
subsidies in that they are intended to spur market and 
technological development, driving cost reductions in 
the process. Opinion is divided over the long-term fate 
of FITs, as it is hoped that renewable technologies will 
be able to operate in the market without price support 
in the future. Importantly, FITs provide financial 
support only to electricity generated and delivered 
to the grid, as opposed to subsidies for the initial 
capital investment.
Basic FITs are conceptually very simple and easy to 
administer, which partly explains their popularity 
and success in accelerating the deployment of RETs. 
Approximately 75% of global installed solar PV 
capacity and 45% of wind power receive some degree 
of supply-side tariff support (Rickerson et al., 2010). 
While FITs are best known for their role in supporting 
investment in RETs in Europe, there is in fact a diverse 
and growing range of experiences across the world, 
from which it is possible to draw some lessons. 
In many OECD countries with mature electricity 
markets, the use of FITs has led to widespread RET 
deployment, as in Germany, Denmark and Spain, 
which have Europe’s largest shares of renewable energy 
generation – particularly grid-connected wind energy 
(Reiche and Bechberger, 2004). In Germany the first 
FIT was introduced in 1991, and by 2008 feed-in 
support totalled €2.5 billion. While 17% of German 
electricity generation is met by renewable sources 
(BMU, 2011), average financial support in 2009 was 
€0.13 per kWh, which equated to €3.83 per household 
per month, or 6% of the average electricity bill.ii 
Crucially, and in order to incentivise constant efficiency 
improvements and innovations, per-unit FITs are 
normally lowered every year (at a predetermined 
and fixed rate), which brings them closer to average 
conventional generation costs. This is known as tariff 
‘degression’. As such, FITs have helped push down 
the per-unit cost of electricity generated by RETs by 
encouraging technical innovation and economies of 
scale. In the case of Germany, annual degression in the 
FIT paid for new RE generation were originally set at 
1% for biomass, 1.5% for wind power and 5% for solar 
PV, which has the highest per-unit tariff. However 
the degression rate has been increased in recent years, 
most notably for solar PV, which, as of 2011, has a 
13% degression rate (IEA, 2011). Nevertheless, FITs 
typically provide investors with a guaranteed revenue 
stream for 10-20 years, as long as the installation 
remains operational. FITs have therefore proved 
successful in reducing the financial risk of investing 
in RETs, as compared to other policies such as 
tradable permits.iii  
However, once RETs take up a larger share of the 
generation market place, FITs can become expensive 
and harder to justify, especially where governments 
claim to be strictly endorsing the principles of 
electricity market liberalisation and/or placing a higher 
value on cheap energy in the short term. Therefore, 
it is important to bear in mind that FITs are only an 
interim policy, designed to accelerate the development 
and diffusion of RETs. Experience shows that diffusion 
will push technologies along the innovation cost curve 
towards market competitiveness with conventional 
energy sources, the environmental impacts of which 
should be internalised or priced in. On the other hand, 
in many developing countries, such as Uganda, which 
has a high dependency on diesel generation, the per-
unit cost of mature RETs such as hydro and wind 
power is already lower than electricity generated from 
the fossil fuel base-load, which is itself on an upward 
price trend due to the increasing scarcity of easily 
accessible oil, gas and coal, as well as their climate and 
pollution externalities.
3The most common features of FIT laws are 
the following:  
• Utilities are obliged to purchase electricity 
supplied to the grid from RE sources generated 
specifically for that purpose (as distinguished 
from net-metering).
• The value of the electricity purchased (the FIT) 
is set by the government at a fixed rate each year, 
which normally declines in value over time so 
as to reward first movers and reflect technology 
cost reductions.
• The value of the FIT differs depending on 
the type, size and location of RE technology 
used, with higher rates paid to the least 
competitive technologies.
• Generators are usually responsible for paying 
for grid connection to the nearest connection 
point (shallow connection charges), whereas the 
grid operator bears the cost of grid extensions. 
Otherwise, in a deep connection charge system, 
the RE generator is normally responsible for 
the grid connection and all associated 
transmission upgrades. 
• FIT contracts are signed between generators 
and utilities, typically for 10-20 years.
History and design of FITs in OECD countries
FITs have been successful in promoting investment in 
RE generation in many developed countries, mainly 
because they minimize the long-term financial risks 
surrounding individual projects. The world’s first FIT 
was legislated in California in 1978 under the federal 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), 
which, in a context of high and rising oil prices, set 
the value of tariff support to reflect the avoided long 
run marginal cost of electricity, i.e. the anticipated cost 
of generating an extra kWh of electricity (Butler and 
Neuhoff, 2004). This, combined with an Investment 
Tax Credit implemented in 1979, underpinned the 
Californian ‘wind rush’ when approximately 15,000 
wind turbines with a combined capacity of 1,200MW 
were installed during the early 1980s. However, the 
policy was withdrawn in 1985 (by which time oil prices 
had fallen to near pre-1973 levels) amid accusations 
that the financial support was too expensive and 
provided unrealistic rates of return for renewable 
energy investors. This experience in itself provided 
lessons for policy-makers seeking to legislate ambitious 
support for renewable energy. 
Arguably the most successful FIT has been in Germany, 
where the policy was first introduced in 1991, initially 
with variable support linked to consumer energy 
prices. However, following a drop in energy prices 
during the late 1990s, the German FIT was fixed 
in 2000 (at different levels depending on the energy 
technology), which had the effect of greatly increasing 
investment in renewable energy capacity, particularly 
in wind and solar PV. While Germany’s decision to fix 
FIT support was a significant boost to the RE industry, 
many studies conclude that other policies, as well as 
the wider market structure, were equally important, 
including the country’s decision to phase out nuclear 
power (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006).
In Germany, installed wind-power capacity increased 
from a total of 56MW in 1990 to 14,600MW 
in 2003, by which time wind power was already 
supplying 6% of Germany’s total electricity demand 
(UNEP, 2007). In 2010, Germany’s total installed 
wind capacity stood at more than 27,000 MW. In 
Denmark, a FIT underpinned rapid investment in 
wind power between 1980 and 2002, which, by 2007, 
accounted for 19.8% of domestic electricity supply 
and approximately 25% of installed capacity (Danish 
Energy Agency, 2009). 
In the UK, plans to introduce a FIT were added to 
the government’s Energy Bill in October 2008 after 
years of having resisted the introduction of direct tariff 
support, with the policy coming into effect in April 
2010. This was a major departure from reliance on a 
micro-generation grant scheme and the ‘Renewables 
Obligation’ (RO), a quota-based mechanism that the 
UK has used to expand renewable energy supplies 
gradually since 2002. Although the RO has enabled 
a doubling of renewable electricity generation in 
the UK since 2002, this is unimpressive given the 
country’s low starting point of around 2%. Indeed, it 
was partly the success of FITs in other countries that 
led the UK government to conduct a policy U-turn. 
4However, this was not done without a major policy 
campaign spearheaded by a coalition of NGOs and 
industry groups.
The specific value of FIT support is usually based on 
the type of RE technology, with the aim of ‘levelling 
the playing field’. As such, FIT support, measured 
as € per kWh, is usually set higher for technologies 
like solar PV, which remain furthest from market 
competitiveness, i.e. are more expensive per kWh of 
electricity generation. Conversely wind power, which 
is often the most cost competitive, tends to receive a 
lower level of FIT support. In order to accelerate cost 
reductions through market expansion, it is important 
to match the relatively high tariff support for expensive 
RET such as solar PV, with a relatively steep rate of 
tariff degression, thus creating strong incentives to 
invest sooner rather than later (Auer et al., 2009).
In addition to technology-based criteria for establishing 
FIT values, the policy can also be calculated on a 
resource basis in an attempt to level the playing 
field further by preventing the developers of wind 
projects from capturing large rents in areas of high 
wind resources. This was done in Germany, where 
the value of tariff support provided for wind farms in 
windy locations was set at the same level as low-wind 
resource locations, but declined at a faster annual rate 
thereafter. However, a resource-based differentiation 
in tariff support can be difficult and time-consuming 
to calculate and administer, and the argument is 
often made that ‘first movers’ deserve to be rewarded 
(assuming they locate their wind farms in the windiest 
locations) for taking a risk with a lesser-established 
technology, and where costs tends to fall along with 
market expansion. 
While support in the form of a high FIT has doubtless 
boosted the market for solar PV in Germany,iv  it was 
not the only policy. The provision of direct installation 
subsidies, such as the 100,000 Roofs Photovoltaic 
Programme, which provided a total subsidy of 35%, 
was equally if not more important in Germany (Stryi-
Hipp, 2009). The relative success of FITs also depends 
upon various non-market factors such as the ease of 
processing RE development applications, i.e., the 
degree of bureaucracy in each country, as well as wider 
social obstacles such as a strong ‘NIMBY’v  effect.  
Some countries, such as the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain operate a 
‘premium’ FIT, whereby developers can choose between 
selling their renewably generated electricity at price set 
at marginal X% above the market price, which tends 
to fluctuate, or opt for a (higher) fixed tariff support. 
In these cases, both the fixed and premium tariffs are 
reviewed by the government each year to reflect changes 
in energy prices and technology costs, while RE project 
developers are free to change between regimes. This 
flexible system is designed to protect both project 
developers and consumers by ensuring that losses and 
excess profits are avoided (Mallon, 2006).
Mendonça et al. (2009) argue that FITs are an 
inherently more inclusive financial mechanism to 
support RETs when compared to the tax credits 
scheme used in the United States. Taking the example 
of the development of wind energy in Denmark, they 
state that ‘..it was driven from the bottom-up, with 
enthusiasts influencing the political process in such 
a way that Government then engaged in providing 
the enabling conditions to boost the development 
of the sector, through economic incentives and 
favourable ownership restrictions’ (p. 384). Taken 
together, Mendonça et al. argue that this institutional 
organisation in Denmark, and the process of creating 
a strong domestic political agenda to support RETs 
(in particular wind energy), was the product of what 
Danish academic Frede Hvelplund terms ‘innovative 
democracy’. Specifically, this is understood as a process 
whereby stakeholders were actively engaged at all 
stages and levels of policy formation and where the 
development of community-owned wind farms spread 
the investment costs, and the income benefits, of wind 
energy down to the household level. This ensured both 
a high level of community ‘buy in’, as well as strong 
and longer term rural support for on-shore wind 
energy, the lack of which has been a major barrier in 
the UK, for example.
FITs are rarely used alone in support of renewable 
energy. In both Germany and Denmark, a 
5combination of investment subsidies for individual 
projects (worth as much as 30% during the early 
days of promoting wind energy in Denmark), tax 
exemptions, soft loans and publicly funded R&D also 
played a major role. While these additional direct and 
indirect financial incentives for investing in RET were 
relatively expensive, it should be remembered that the 
costs of RETs per MW installed capacity have fallen 
dramatically since the 1970s, in large part thanks to 
the pioneering industry support and development that 
was achieved in countries like Denmark.
Criticisms and shortcomings of FITs in OECD 
countries
While FITs have been very successful in many EU 
countries, if judged in terms of RE capacity installed, 
they have some drawbacks and detractors. According 
to ‘standard’ neo-classical theory, as a form of cross-
subsidy FITs should act as a drag on domestic 
economic growth, productivity and competitiveness. 
In reality, the direct economic impact of FITs is almost 
negligible, at least in high-income countries. In part, 
this is due to the relatively small component that 
electricity comprises for most household and business 
expenditure (indeed the share of electricity has steadily 
declined as an input factor among OECD countries 
since 1990). In ‘pioneer’ countries such as Denmark 
and Germany, tariff support for renewable energy also 
helped nurture a new multi-billion euro industry and 
created thousands of manufacturing and engineering 
jobs, though these are ‘one-off’ benefits that can only 
be captured by such pioneering states. 
Taken at face value, fixed-rate FITs do not create 
competitive pressure between electricity producers 
since investors are able to calculate, with a higher degree 
of certainty, their rate of return based on the long-term 
structure of tariff support, i.e. they have a guaranteed 
fixed income. This can be compared to the policy of 
providing premium payments, or bonuses, on top of 
the market (i.e. variable) price of electricity, which in 
theory provides operators with a greater incentive to 
reduce their costs in order to maximize project returns. 
However, this assumes that the premium is not set too 
high, in which case it can lead to excess profits if the 
market price of electricity increases significantly, as 
was the experience in Spain. In an attempt to manage 
the cost of financial support to RE generators, Spain 
introduced floor and ceiling prices to its system of 
feed-in premiums in 2007.
Consequently, FITs as a generic policy are often 
criticised by free-market and fossil-fuel lobby groups 
as an expensive means to support investment in RE 
generation, and specifically because the cost of tariff 
support may become unsustainable once the share 
of RE generation becomes significant. As such, free-
market advocates often argue that, by providing fixed 
payment levels, FITs are both inefficient and have a 
distortive effect on energy markets. In the EU, this 
has led some analysts to conclude that, if the cost of 
FITs were to rise significantly, they would undermine 
the Union’s wider policy agenda of creating a single, 
liberalised European energy market (Sijm, 2002). 
However, given the years of experience gained with 
FITs within many EU member states and the steady 
rise of RE installed capacity across the EU, energy 
policy debate has begun to centre on proposals to 
harmonise the support provided to RE. The European 
Commission favours ‘well-adapted’ FITs as the ‘most 
efficient and effective support schemes for promoting 
renewable electricity’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008), a position supported by various 
academic studies, including Haas et al., 2011. Indeed, 
in July 2010, the European Energy Commissioner 
Günther Oettinger called for a harmonisation of FITs 
between EU Member States (Euractiv, 2010). As well 
as seeking to optimise net support for RE across the 
27-Member State bloc, such policy harmonisation 
stands to reduce market distortions in anticipation of a 
region-wide energy trading system.
To a large extent, the success of FITs depends upon 
the stability and certainty they provide for investors. 
As such, too many changes made to FIT values can 
have a detrimental effect on the market by eroding 
investor confidence. In Europe, since 2008 the 
stability of some FIT regimes has been undermined 
by economic recession and government austerity. 
Although they are not directly financed by government 
budgets, FITs do contribute to a higher net tax burden 
6for the economy, which has made them the target of 
governments wishing to reduce economy-wide costs, 
despite the greater long-term benefits of minimizing 
dependence on imported fossil fuels. Indeed, it is easy 
for governments to target FITs amid an economic 
recession, and in countries such as Spain that have 
a relatively high FIT bill, pressure to streamline the 
economy is also coming from the European Central 
Bank and international credit rating agencies. 
FITs have also been the victim of their own success 
in many European countries, such as Spain and Italy, 
where investment in solar PV projects have greatly 
exceeded expectations, thus exacerbating political 
pressures to reduce the levelised cost of FITs among 
all ratepayers. In 2011 the UK government announced 
it would conduct a review of its FIT law, less than a 
year after it came into effect, which is highly likely to 
damage the country’s nascent solar power industry. 
Such policy change can greatly undermine investor 
confidence in the stability of FITs. However, even 
if necessary economic incentives are introduced 
via a well-designed, clear and stable FIT, the rapid 
deployment of RETs (whether small or large-scale) 
can be hindered by unfavourable planning regulations, 
import taxation etc., depending on the circumstances 
in each country.
The pre-requisites and characteristics of successful FITs 
are as follows:
• Eligible RETs should be clearly defined, and 
include ‘dispatchable’ base-load generation 
technologies such as biomass, hydro and 
geothermal, as well as variable RETs such as 
wind and solar PV in order to encourage a 
diversified energy portfolio.
• Countries should conduct or commission in-
depth renewable energy resource assessments 
and mapping and impact assessments, so that 
investors (be they public or private) know which 
RETs and locations are optimal.   
• Tariffs should be technology-specific and 
based on the cost of generation, as opposed 
to final consumer prices or ‘avoided’ costs, so 
as to provide a clear and stable internal rate of 
return to investors (typically between 7-10%), 
while avoiding the risk of windfall profits at the 
expense of consumers.
• Apply a hybrid rate of tariff decline, i.e. where 
the annual rate of decline in tariff support has a 
fixed baseline, with the option to reduce tariffs 
for new projects further if and when major cost 
reductions are achieved for a specific technology.
• Especially in developing countries, FIT policies 
should be developed in conjunction with 
wider macro-economic policy-making and 
calculations so as to understand their likely 
impacts on the economy and development 
goals.
Sources: Couture and Gagnon, 2010; 
Mendonça and Jacobs, 2009; Haas et al., 
2004; Haas et al., 2011.
Designing FITs for developing countries
Despite the success of FITs in various OECD countries, 
particularly in Europe, there are some basic reasons 
why they may have to be adapted to work in developing 
countries. Of fundamental importance is the fact that 
most developing countries have a smaller proportion 
of consumers connected to the grid, often less than 
25% in sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that FITs will not 
in themselves help address the need to expand energy 
access. Indeed, they may even undermine policies to 
increase access to electricity in areas where demand can 
be met by lower-cost centralised thermal generation, 
especially in urban areas (though energy security 
and fuel-mix diversification are common concerns 
that reduce the cost benefits of conventional thermal 
generation). In countries where there is an abundance 
and high use of low-cost primary energy for electricity, 
such as with coal in South Africa, the cost of FITs will 
need to be relatively high in order to level the playing 
field between competing technologies. This is likely 
to make FITs politically unpopular, and in the case of 
South Africa, in 2011 the National Energy Regulator 
(NERSA) launched a review of the country’s 2009 FIT 
with a remit to reduce tariff support by as much as 
42% for solar PV.vi
7Secondly, businesses and households in developing 
countries that do consume electricity generally spend 
a higher proportion of their income on it, meaning 
that any marginal tariff increase will have a greater 
economic impact. As such, the funding mechanism 
for FITs may have to be structured differently in 
developing countries, for example, with financing 
from international donors or centralised national 
funds, instead of by consumers. However, in countries 
that provide subsidies for fossil fuels, the net macro-
economic cost of financing FITs could be zero or 
negative if these are phased out during the time period 
of FIT support.
There is also a risk that centralised financing for FITs 
could undermine their economic and administrative 
simplicity, i.e. their strengths, and move them 
towards a more traditional form of industrial subsidy 
that is exposed to greater political interference and 
uncertainty. Alternatively, in order to help minimise 
the costs to consumers, FITs can be designed with a 
nationally appropriate cap placed on the percentage 
of installed capacity from RETs. While this is far 
from ‘ideal’, it does at least allow for a controlled 
expansion of the local renewable energy industry, 
which is more likely to develop without future 
support once the initial cost and experience barriers 
have been broken down (IEA, 2010; Mendonça and 
Jacobs, 2009).
In the context of developing countries, many of 
which still operate state-owned and/or monopolistic 
electricity utilities, it is useful to remember that FITs 
do not depend upon a wider framework of market 
liberalisation, although such a framework is likely to 
provide greater security for investors. The important 
basic elements of FITs are that they combine 
guaranteed tariff support, purchase obligations and 
regulated grid access, which, if not tampered with by 
governments, provide a stable investment framework 
for a diversity of independent power producers. This 
means that investors will look closely at the stability 
of the public utility in order to assess the security of 
power purchase agreements, adding to the argument 
for focusing commercial investments on low-cost RETs 
such as hydro and biomass in developing countries. 
There are also societal factors that stand to challenge 
the successful application of FITs, given that they 
have to be adapted to a particular set of national 
circumstances. For example, Mendonça et al. (2009) 
maintain that the conditions necessary to achieve 
the ‘innovative democracy’ that enabled the rapid 
deployment of RETs in Denmark are more likely to 
be found in industrialised and democratic societies, 
though they do not make sweeping statements to 
exclude all developing countries. It appears to be a moot 
point whether this process can be reverse-engineered in 
countries that do not have a strong culture of bottom-
up and/or truly democratic decision-making. 
In some developing countries, RETs are already cost 
competitive with conventional energy, especially 
where there is a high dependence upon small and 
medium-sized diesel generators. Where this is the 
case, the introduction of a relatively low FIT is 
likely to stabilise, and even reduce, the market price 
of electricity, especially when fuels are imported and 
continue to follow a long-run price increase. In these 
circumstances, the free-market response would be to 
argue that a FIT is unnecessary, since price signals alone 
would trigger investment in RETs. In theory yes, but 
in reality investors and governments alike tend to ‘stick 
to what they know’, even if there are clear short - and 
long - term costs in doing so. Given that FITs not only 
provide tariff support but also allow IPPs to connect 
to the grid, they can act as a ‘package’ enabling RETs 
to overcome the technological lock-in of conventional 
energy supplies. Nonetheless, it is evident that in 
most countries free-market price signals alone will not 
achieve the levels of deployment of renewable energy 
required to decarbonise our energy systems, hence the 
need for long-term bankable incentives. 
There is increasing evidence for and arguments in 
support of applying FITs to mini-grids, especially 
in developing countries (DBCCA, 2011; Solano-
Peralta et al., 2009). Developing business models for 
FIT application to mini-grids is especially relevant 
for geographically large developing countries with 
low levels of energy access. This could serve as an 
important economic bridge between the use of 
decentralised off-grid RETs used in mostly remote 
8and isolated locations, and the high cost of connecting 
communities that have a low demand load, located 
relatively far from the grid. However, given the small 
size of the systems, it is not clear whether RETs would 
really ‘feed in’ (i.e. contribute to) the mini-grid, or 
simply dominate them. In the latter case there is a risk 
that, in applying FITs to mini-grids, they would end 
up operating as a direct subsidy paid to remunerate 
RE generators, as opposed to providing support at the 
margins to enable RETs to compete with conventional 
energy technologies.
Following the COP15 in Copenhagen, the United 
Nations Secretary General’s Advisory Group on Energy 
and Climate Change (AGECC) requested Deutsche 
Bank Climate Change Advisors (DBCCA) to develop 
the idea of a public-private Global Energy Transfer 
Feed-in Tariff (GET FiT). The GET FiT concept is 
primarily designed to mitigate investment risk for RE 
projects in developing countries by passing the bill for 
FIT support on to donor agencies. DBCCA analyse 
FITs only from the perspective of investors, whose main 
criterion is to gauge the extent to which a particular 
policy framework is likely to achieve Transparency, 
Longevity and Certainty (TLC). This is a simple yet 
comprehensive approach to understanding policy ‘best 
practice’, though one focused on ‘de-risking’ business 
models and attracting mainly private investment in RE 
projects in developing countries. 
Rickerson et al. (2010) focus on Tanzania as a case 
study of a developing country that is attempting to 
implement a politically viable and investor-friendly 
FIT. Applying the measures of TLC to the Tanzanian 
government’s 2009 Small Power Producer (SPP) law, 
they conclude that the framework, which includes an 
initial FIT of US$0.077/kWh, is sufficient to attract 
investment in the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of RE projects 
such as small hydro and biomass, but not enough to 
promote wind or solar power projects.vii  Rickerson et 
al. maintain that the key shortcoming in the design 
of the Tanzanian FIT is that the value is calculated 
on the basis of avoided costs, not technology-specific 
generation costs, which would provide greater certainty 
for investors who need to calculate a project’s internal 
rate of return. At the same time, the Tanzanian SPP is 
praised for its transparency and for covering payments 
for projects connected to both grid and rural mini-
grids. This is particularly significant in a country 
where less than 20% of the population have access to 
electricity.
Finally, the GET FiT concept maintains that FITs 
will not be successful in developing countries unless 
local financing is secured in RE projects, even though 
financial markets in developing countries (especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa) often lack diversity and flexibility 
and generally regard RE projects as high risk. Rickerson 
et al. argue that local financing can be secured by the 
provision of technical assistance to local lenders aimed 
at minimising fears regarding investment in alternative 
energy projects, and by sharing the financial risk with 
foreign investors and donor agencies. However, it is 
not yet clear how the necessary international funds can 
be secured in the long term to provide the financing 
for FITs that investors (whether local or foreign) are 
likely to demand. The problem of long-term financing 
is currently being addressed by the GET FiT initiative, 
including the possibility of tapping into bond markets, 
backed up by long-term annual commitments from 
donor agencies. Nonetheless, this centralised approach 
to financing FITs is inherently more risky in terms of 
longevity and certainty, especially since the cycles of 
donor financing do not currently fit this model.
Conclusions
Many studies have concluded that RETs are a viable 
means to increase access to electricity in developing 
countries, as well as helping to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases. Yet it is not always obvious how to 
reconcile a desired expansion of access to affordable 
electricity with an increase in the installed capacity 
of RETs that generally have higher per kWh up-front 
capital costs than fossil fuel generation. Nevertheless, 
when combined with grid expansion (and possibly 
mini-grids), FIT-backed renewable energy can also 
achieve co-benefits by facilitating wider investment 
in rural areas, e.g. with community electrification 
and generation programmes. This requires FITs to 
be implemented in conjunction with other rural 
development programmes. However, implementing 
a FIT alone does not guarantee that investments 
9in renewable energy projects will follow, and it is 
important to remember that their success in many 
OECD countries has also been bolstered by other 
financial support mechanisms.
Further, FITs should be regarded as just one element 
in wider efforts to create an ‘enabling framework’ 
for investment in renewable energy, albeit a central 
element and one that can go a long way in helping to 
‘de-risk’ RE projects in both developed and developing 
countries. However, in understanding the relative 
success of FITs the devil lies in the detail. There exist 
a wide variety of FITs across countries, all of which 
have a specific set of national circumstances. Good, 
location-specific design and implementation is key. 
Although FITs aim to reduce economic barriers and 
create a level playing field for a variety of electricity 
generation technologies, they are ultimately an 
expression of political will and, as a form of price-
setting regulation, cannot easily keep pace with 
technological progress or reflect cost reductions. 
This process requires regular monitoring in order to 
control costs, maintain industry stability, keep CO2 
reductions and RE expansion targets on track, and 
maintain and enhance public support. The growth of a 
national RE industry and the creation of new business 
and job opportunities will inevitably bolster this 
support. Alternatively, countries can opt for tenders for 
a specific capacity volume, which imposes a ceiling and 
floor price for RE generation, thus creating a hybrid 
incentive mechanism that blends a price target with 
a quantity objective. This kind of performance-based 
incentive is similarly effective as FITs and appeals to 
countries with different economic models and cultures, 
e.g. Chile with its strict market orientation. 
By providing fixed income support for RE generation, 
FITs will always be the target of free-market critics eager 
to brand such interventions ‘inefficient and expensive’. 
However, this accusation is often unfounded and/
or exaggerated and fails to appreciate the far larger 
costs associated with conventional energy systems. 
For example, little or no mainstream recognition is 
generally given to the higher external (non-market) 
costs of conventional fossil-fuel electricity generation, 
principally their CO2 emissions, contribution 
to air pollution and the simple fact that they are 
finite resources. 
While the electricity sector in many countries is no 
longer in receipt of direct subsidies following a wave 
of privatization and liberalization policies (promoted, 
in the case of developing countries, by the IFIs during 
the 1990s and 2000s), the value of historical state 
subsidies, direct and indirect, provided to conventional 
fossil fuel-based and nuclear electricity generation 
runs into hundreds of billions of dollars – a history 
that has helped ensure the current low prices through 
technological development. 
In conclusion, FITs can help investors overcome some of 
the strictly financial barriers to investing in RE projects. 
However, for effective scaling-up of investment in RE, 
there also needs to be concerted efforts to overcome 
the non-financial barriers, including low levels of 
stakeholder participation in decision-making processes 
and community ownership of individual projects. 
Although it is unwise to generalise, a particular risk 
in implementing a FIT in developing countries is that 
utility prices, including energy, are an easy target for 
political manipulation by governments keen to be seen 
as tackling poverty and providing politically popular 
welfare benefits. Even if strong and stable political 
support is provided for FITs, they may fall victim 
to cut-backs at times of economic constraint, as has 
happened in various OECD countries, including the 
UK, Spain and Italy. 
On the plus side, FITs are conceptually simple and 
democratic, which makes them an appealing policy 
tool to help create a viable enabling framework for 
significant investment in renewable energy. While they 
have had most experience and success in developed 
countries, FITs can be considered by governments and 
NGOs in less developed countries where there is plenty 
of scope to innovate and adapt the basic elements of tariff 
support to suit local circumstances. However, in order 
to optimise the broader development benefits resulting 
from the scaling up of RETs, coupled with reduced 
environmental impacts, due consideration should 
be given right at the planning stage to institutional 
capacity and resource and impact assessments. 
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Endnotes
i.  FITs should be distinguished from net-metering policies, 
which allow for usually small-scale generators of RE electricity 
to consume their energy on site, while remaining customers are 
connected to the grid. Although net-metering policies enable 
generators to supply the grid when their supply exceeds demand, 
the price paid for this electricity is normally equal to the market 
spot rate, i.e. unsubsidized and sometimes even zero.
ii. However, according to the Germany Ministry of Environment 
(BMU), the cost of FIT support is rising rapidly in Germany, 
largely due to the explosion of growth in higher-cost Solar PV 
installations. BMU estimates that the average cost of FITs will be 
more than 10 EUR per household per month (equivalent to 14% 
of the bill) in 2011. (Reference: BMU, April 2011, ‘what effect 
does the promotion of renewable energies have on the domestic 
price of electricity?’ (Welche Wirkung hat die Förderung der 
erneuerbaren Energien auf den Haushalts-Strompreis?).  
www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/
pdf/hintergrund_ee_umlage_bf.pdf 
iii. This conclusion has been reached by a number of authoritative 
studies, including the 2006 Stern Review into the economics 
of climate change mitigation. Stern reports that ‘comparisons 
between deployment support through tradable quotas and feed-in 
tariff price support suggest that feed-in mechanisms achieve larger 
deployment at lower costs.’
iv. At almost 17,000 MW, Germany’s installed solar PV generation 
capacity accounted for more than 50% of the global total in 2010, 
most of which is grid-connected.
v.  NIMBY: ‘Not In My Back Yard’
vi. However, in the case of South Africa, the key barrier to the success 
of FIT is that Eskom (the state-owned electricity utility) is the sole 
buyer of electricity and has no obligation to buy FIT-supported 
renewable electricity (Pegels, 2009)
vii. Examples of low-cost RE projects could include those identified 
by the Poverty Alleviation through Cleaner Energy from Agro-
industries in Africa (PACEAA) project in East Africa. Funded 
by the European Commission’s COOPENER programme, the 
project addressed the issue of rural electrification as a means of 
alleviating poverty, in particular by using electricity from agro-
industries. www.paceaa.org/
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